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Jason Rowland entered a conditional guilty

to one count of felony

possession of a controlled substance, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress. He appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction.
Mr. Rowland asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated because law
enforcement officers searched his person without a warrant and in the absence of any
valid exceptions

the warrant requirement.

Prior to the search in which illegal

was discovered in

Rowland's

pants pocket, Mr. Rowland was merely detained for officer safety while the officers
conducted a search warrant.

Mr. Rowland asserts that the State failed to meet its

burden of proving that the search of his person fell within an exception to the warrant
requirement as the warrant did not allow for a search of his person. The district court
erred when it denied his motion to suppress finding that that the search warrant
authorized a search of his person or, alternatively, that he was lawfully searched
incident to arrest.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On the evening of November 2, 2013, officers entered Jason Rowland's home.
(2/27/14 Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.2.) The officers had a search warrant and were looking
for a stolen chainsaw and drugs.

(2/27/14 Tr., p.8, Ls.11-13.)

Officer Thiemann

encountered Mr. Rowland in the basement and detained Mr. Rowland by handcuffing

1

him. 1 (2i27/14 Tr., p.8, L.2 - p.9, L.4.) She then asked another officer to perform a patdown search of Mr. Rowland for weapons, and one of the items retrieved from

Mr. Rowland's pants pocket was a baggie containing a crystal substance, which was
later determined to be methamphetamine. (2/27/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-26, p.16, Ls.16-18,
p.22, Ls.3-6; PSI, p.130.) Mr. Rowland was arrested for possession of stolen property,
possession of drug paraphernalia (found in another room of the house), and possession
of a controlled substance. 2 (2/27/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-25.)
On November 25, 2013, an Information was filed charging Mr. Rowland with
felony possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.45-47.)

A persistent violator sentencing

enhancement was also filed as Part II of the Information. (R., pp.48-50.) Mr. Rowland
filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support requesting that the district
court suppress "all evidence seized, all statements made by the defendant, and all fruits
or products of the warrantless search and seizure of the defendant."

(R., p.108.)

Mr. Rowland asserted that his rights under Article I, Sections 13 and 17 of the Idaho
Constitution, and under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution were violated.

(R., pp.108-112.) Mr. Rowland asserted that the search

warrant was exclusively for certain property in the residence.

(R., pp.109-110.)

Although the final page of the warrant constituted a "command to search the above

described premises and persons" there was no indication in the warrant that

1

Although the State failed offer any evidence of the search warrant encompassing
Mr. Rowland's home, a search warrant was issued which authorized law enforcement to
search the premises for illegal drugs and a Stihl chainsaw. (11/4/13 Search Warrant,
attached to Motion to Augment filed on February 12, 2015.)

2

Mr. Rowland was to be searched when the warrant was executed.

(R., p.110.)

Mr. Rowland also asserted that the search was not a valid Terry search for weapons
because the search was not just a pat-down for weapons. 3
Mr. Rowland

was

not under arrest at the time

he

was

(R., p.110.)
searched

Further,
and

the

methamphetamine was discovered. (R., p.110.)
At the hearing on the suppression motion, the prosecutor called Officer
Thiemann. (2/27/14 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-13.) Officer Thiemann testified that she requested
the search warrant and executed the search warrant at Mr. Rowland's house. 4 (2/27/14
Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.2.)

Officer Thiemann went inside the house with other law

enforcement officers, but she initially went downstairs into the basement area. (2/27/14
Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.2.) After tripping and falling over multiple objects on the stairs,
including a chainsaw case and chainsaw parts, she made contact with Mr. Rowland in
the basement.

(2/27/14 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-19.) She immediately detained Mr. Rowland by

placing handcuffs on him. (2/27/14 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.4.) She testified that he was
not under arrest at that time, but he was being detained as they were securing
everybody in the residence for the search warrant. (2/27/14 Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.4,
p.16, L.21 - p.17, L.4.) After handcuffing Mr. Rowland, she took him up the stairs and
handed him off to another officer, saying: "He has not been patted down or checked for
weapons."

(2/27/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-25.)

She continued searching and found, in the

2

Mr. Rowland was never prosecuted for possessing the stolen chainsaw. (See Idaho
Supreme Court Data Repository).
3 In Terry, the United States Supreme Court held that "an officer may conduct a limited
pat-down search, or frisk, 'of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her
body in an attempt to find weapons."' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
3

room located at the top of the stairs, drug paraphernalia, a white powdery substance,
and a green leafy substance. (2/27/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.3-9.) After the paraphernalia and
controlled substances were found, the officers removed the pieces of the chainsaw and
matched the serial number to the one identified as stolen. (2/27/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-13.)
Officer Thiemann testified that she told Mr. Rowland what he was under arrest for when
she transported him to the jail-for possession of paraphernalia, possession of the
white powdery substance found in his pocket, and possession of stolen property.
(2/27/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-25.)
The State called Officer Bekker to testify. (2/27/14 Tr., p.19, Ls.16-17.) Officer
Bekker testified that he was on duty on November 2, 2013, and that he was at a
residence participating in the service of a search warrant. (2/27/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.19-24.)
While Mr. Rowland was detained, Detective Bekker was asked to search Mr. Rowland's
person so he conducted a "Terry search" of Mr. Rowland's pants pockets and
discovered a white powdery substance, later identified as methamphetamine, in a
pocket of the pants. 5 (2/27/14 Tr., p.21, L.16 - p.22, L.6, p.27, Ls.15-18, p.28, Ls.1323.) At the time, Officer Bekker knew that Mr. Rowland was detained, as he was in the
handcuffs. (2/27/14 Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.1.)

4

The residence was actually his mother's house, but Mr. Rowland had resided there,
with his mother, for approximately the last nine years. (2/27/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-19;
11/21/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-23.)
5 Officer Bekker testified that in conducting a "Terry search," or pat-down, he has been
trained to take everything out of the person's pockets to confirm that there's nothing
there that's going to hurt him, and then he sets it off to the side to be given back to them
after - once they are released, if they're only being detained. (2/27/14 Tr., p.26, Ls.714.)

4

At the hearing on Mr. Rowland's motion to suppress, the defense and the State
both presented argument. The State argued that this was either a search incident

to

arrest and that such a search can precede the actual arrest so long as it is recent in
time, or the search was authorized because Mr. Rowland was on location for the service
of a search warrant, or, as a third theory, that the drugs would have been discovered
under the inevitable discovery argument, based on the decision in State v. Cook, 106
Idaho 209 (Ct. App. 1984). (2/27/14 Tr., p.30, L.13- p.35, L.9.) The State also argued
that the officers had probable cause to conclude that Mr. Rowland possessed the
chainsaw. (2/27/14 Tr., p.38, L.23 - p.39, L.7.) The defense argued that the residence,
and the illegal objects found therein, could not be tied to Mr. Rowland.

(2/27/14

Tr., p.35, L.23 - p.36, L.23.) The defense further argued that the search warrant was
only for the residence, not the search of the person of Mr. Rowland. (2/27/14 Tr., p.37,
Ls.1-6.)
The district court took the matter under consideration and issued a written
decision denying the motion, finding that the search warrant mentioned Mr. Rowland
and thus authorized a search of the residence as well as a search of Mr. Rowland's
person "for the items described in the warrant which included the chainsaw,
Methamphetamine, Marijuana, and drug paraphernalia." (R., p.131.) The district court
also found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Rowland once Detective
Thiemann saw the chainsaw as described in the search warrant. (R., pp.131-133.) The
district court declined to address the State's alternative argument that the evidence
would have been inevitably discovered. (R., pp.124-133.)

5

Following the denial of his suppression motion, Mr. Rowland entered a
conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance, reserving the right
to appeal the suppression issue. (3/25/14 Tr., p.3, L.17 - p.4, L.4; R., pp.145-146.) As
part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor possession of
paraphernalia charge, the persistent violator enhancement, and the enhancement for a
subsequent drug offense. (3/25/14 Tr., p.3, L.17 - p.4, L.4, p.12, Ls.3-14, p.20, Ls.6-11;
R., pp.145-146.) On June 10, 2014, Mr. Rowland was sentenced to a unified sentence
of seven years, with three years fixed, and the district court retained jurisdiction. 6
(R., pp.152-161.) On June 13, 2014, Mr. Rowland filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.168171, 179-183.)

As of the filing of his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Rowland was still on the rider.
Supreme Court Data Repository.)
6

6

(Idaho

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rowland's motion to suppress?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rowland's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Rowland asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches

protected by Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution was violated when officers conducted a warrantless search
of his person.
Mindful

of the

inevitable discovery exception

to

the

exclusionary rule,

Mr. Rowland asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated because law enforcement officers searched his person without a warrant
and in the absence of any valid exceptions to the warrant requirement. 7

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

Idaho appellate courts accept the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous; factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence are not clearly
erroneous. State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128 (2010 ); State v. Araiza, 14 7 Idaho 371,
374 (Ct. App. 2009). Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given

7

The doctrine of inevitable discovery, or the independent source doctrine, is an
exception to the exclusionary rule. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908 (Ct. App. 2006). In
order for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, the State must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information at issue would have independently
been discovered through lawful means. Id. 142 Idaho at 915. Although the inevitable
discovery doctrine was never analyzed by the district court in this case, even had
Officer Bekker not (impermissibly) searched Mr. Rowland when he did, Mr. Rowland
would eventually have been arrested for possession of stolen property and searched
incident to his arrest. (See 2/27/14 Tr., p.17, L.21-p.18, L.2, p.33, L.10-p.35, L.7.)
8

to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion
of the trial court." Id. (quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 8·10 (2009)). However, a
trial court's legal conclusions and whether constitutional requirements have been
satisfied based on the facts found are freely reviewed. Araiza, 147 Idaho at 374.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rowland's Motion To Suppress
Because The District Court Erroneously Found That The Search Warrant
Included A Person(s) To Be Searched
Mr. Rowland challenges the district court's factual finding that the scope of the

search warrant included the search of his person.

The district court found that the

search warrant identified Mr. Rowland as a person to be searched.

However, the

search warrant was for a residence only and did not allow for any persons to be
searched.

It is not possible to reconcile the search warrant with the district court's

finding of fact because there were no persons identified by the search warrant.
Therefore, the district court's reading of the search warrant to include the person of
Mr. Rowland was unreasonable. Thus the search warrant cannot constitute substantial,
competent evidence to support the district court's finding that Mr. Rowland was
identified in the search warrant as a person to be searched, and the district court's
finding was clearly erroneous.
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17.

A warrant under the Fourth

Amendment must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Thus, when a warrant includes a person
to be searched, the warrant must identify with particularity which person or persons may

9

be searched pursuant to the search warrant. Id. A search warrant, like the one in this
case, identifying several individuals as persons having knowledge of one of the items
being searched for, is insufficient to authorize a search of any person. Here, the plain
language of the warrant did not authorize the officers to search any persons found at
the residence. C.f. Commonwealth v. Brown, 861 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007)
(holding that search warrant did not satisfy particularity requirement of Fourth
Amendment where warrant only authorized search of "any person present" and did not
name anyone as a person who may be searched); State v. Garcia, 166 P.3d 848
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that search warrant for "any and all persons present" in
motel room violated Fourth Amendment's requirement of particularity); Webster v. State,
250 A.2d 279 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1969) (holding that search of appellant could not be
upheld under provision of warrant which commanded search of "all other persons who
may be participating in said criminal activities").
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "[i]n general, courts should avoid
hypertechnicality when interpreting warrants" and that "[w]arrants should be viewed in a
commonsense and realistic fashion."

State v. Sapp, 110 Idaho 153, 155 (Ct. App.

1986); State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382,388 (Ct. App. 1985). In both Sapp and Holman,
the relevant question was whether the search warrants at issue were sufficiently specific
in identifying the places to be searched in order for the warrants to be valid on their
faces. Sapp, 110 Idaho at 154-56; Holman, 109 Idaho at 388. In both cases, the Court
of Appeals recognized that a search warrant need not contain a technical legal
description of the place to be searched. In both cases, the Court held that as long as
the warrant contains a description sufficient for the place to be searched to be located

10

and distinguished from surrounding areas, the warrant is valid on its face. Sapp, 110
Idaho at 155-56; Holman, 109 Idaho 388.
When law enforcement officers are executing a search warrant on a property,
officers are allowed to briefly detain the occupants of the premises described in the
warrant. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981 ); State v. Slater, 133 Idaho
882, 889 (Ct. App. 1999). In Summers, the Court explained, "a warrant to search for
contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to
detain occupants of the premises while a proper search is being conducted." Id. at 705.
This limited authority to detain occupants arises for three important reasons identified by
the Court: 1) preventing the flight of the occupants, 2) minimizing the potential for harm
to law enforcement, and 3) facilitating the completion of the search. Id. at 702-03.
The search warrant in this case did not authorize the search of Mr. Rowland, and
in fact the search warrant did not authorize the search of any persons-the warrant was
only for the search of a residence.

(11/4/13 Search Warrant, attached to Motion to

Augment filed on February 12, 2015.)

If the warrant was intended to allow for the

search of Mr. Rowland, it was deficient.
The actual search warrant is contained in the first three paragraphs, and
describes the premises to be searched, and the property to be searched for. (11/4/13
Search Warrant, pp.1-2, attached to Motion to Augment filed on February 12, 2015.) It
is clear that the rest of the warrant, anything after paragraph three, is merely extraneous
language which mirrors the affidavit. ( 11 /4/13 Search Warrant, attached to Motion to
Augment filed on February 12, 2015.) Notably, the search warrant does not identify any
persons as persons to be searched pursuant to the warrant. (11/4/13 Search Warrant,

11

attached to Motion to Augment filed on February 12, 2015.) While several individuals
were named in the affidavit, the language of the warrant does not dictate that any of the
persons named in the affidavit be searched.

(11/4/13 Search Warrant, attached to

Motion to Augment filed on February 12, 2015.)
The warrant incorporated the language of the affidavit in its entirety. The place to
be searched was identified in Paragraph 1 :
The following location/s: A dwelling located at 529 California Street in the
City of Gooding, County of Gooding and State of Idaho, the dwelling is tan
in color with brown trim with the front door located on the face of the
house facing East.
(11/4/13 Search Warrant, p.1, attached to Motion to Augment filed on February 12,
2015.) The property to be searched was identified in Paragraph 2:
For the following property: Marijuana, Meth, drug trafficking paraphernalia
along with any implements, and paraphernalia used in the sale, and use of
Marijuana or Meth, including, but not limited to scales, zip lock baggies,
paper bindles, photographs, sifters, ledger books or other sheets
memorializing the sale of any controlled substances, all apparent
instrumentalities or items evidencing the same, packaging materials,
records, utility receipts, envelopes, letters, keys and other indicia of
control, ownership, to-wit A [sic] dwelling located at 529 California street
[sic] in the City of Gooding, County of Gooding and State of Idaho, the
dwelling is tan in color with brown trim with the front door located on the
face of the residence facing East. The numbers 529 California located on
the north side of the front door.
(11/4/13 Search Warrant, p.1, attached to Motion to Augment filed on February 12,
2015.)

A liberal reading of the warrant could include the chainsaw described in

Paragraph 3:
Jeremy Todd Larson told me that he had stolen a chain saw [sic] and that
he dropped it off with Jason Rowland located at 529 California Street. The
information that we have received on the chain saw [sic] made by Stihl
and that the serial number is 282877540 and that it is orange and white in
color and that it was in an orange case.

12

(11/4/13 Search Warrant, pp.1-2, attached to Motion to Augment filed on February 12,
2015.) The final page of the search warrant includes the language:
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to search the above described
premises and persons for the property described above, TO SEIZE it if
found and to bring it promptly before the court above named.
(11/4/13 Search Warrant, p.4, attached to Motion to Augment filed on February 12,
2015.) However, the boilerplate language "search the above described premises and
persons" is a reference to the premises.

The standard language at the end of the

warrant is insufficient to allow a reasonable conclusion that any persons were to be
searched.

(11/4/13 Search Warrant, pp.1-2, attached to Motion to Augment filed on

February 12, 2015.) Because search warrants must be given a commonsense reading,
the search warrant in this case only permits a search of the residence because there
were no "persons" specifically identified and described in the warrant as those to be
searched pursuant to the warrant.
Ultimately, a valid search warrant may not be expanded to include places or
persons not described therein. 8 In this case, if the officers believed the evidence sought
could likely have been found on Mr. Rowland's person, the State could simply have

8

At the suppression hearing, the State argued that search warrants may authorize the
search of a person, and relied on a recent Court of Appeals opinion, State v. Russo,
2013 WL 777438 (Ct. App. March 4, 2013), for this proposition (2/27/14 Tr., p.31, L.3 p.32, L.8.); however, the opinion relied upon by the State was not yet final, and the
Idaho Supreme Court granted review of the decision. State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299,
336 P.3d 232 (2014). Although the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
conviction, it noted that the record did not reflect whether the officer was aware that a
search warrant had been issued before detaining the defendant and patting him down.
Russo, 157 Idaho at_, 336 P.3d at 238, n.1. Thus the State's authority in support of
its contention that a search warrant authorizes police to seize and search a person as
part of the service of the search warrant was based on an unpublished opinion that was
superseded by an Idaho Supreme Court opinion, and is therefore unpersuasive.

13

sought a warrant authorizing a search of his residence and his person.

While the

officers were permitted to detain Mr. Rowland based on his status as an occupant of the
house, such was not sufficient to allow a search of his person.

D.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rowland's Motion To Suppress
Because Officer Bekker's Search Of Mr. Rowland VVas Beyond The Permissible
Scope Of A Fourth Amendment Terry Frisk For Weapons
The officer's search of Mr. Rowland's pocket was beyond the scope of a Terry

frisk and was beyond the minimum intrusion necessary to determine if Mr. Rowland was
armed. The officer's decision to indiscriminately remove all contents of Mr. Rowland's
pockets was unreasonable and exceeded the scope of a legitimate weapons search
under the Fourth Amendment, and the district court erred in denying Mr. Rowland's
motion to suppress all evidence stemming from the unlawful search.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, and warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.
See, e.g., State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 837-838 (2004). The State may overcome

the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the warrantless search fell
within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
838.

LaMay, 140 Idaho at

If the State fails to meet this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the

illegal search, including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegal
search, is inadmissible in court. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219 (1999); Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987).

One exception to the warrant requirement was established by the United States
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

The stop and frisk exception

established in Terry allows an officer to stop and frisk an individual for weapons if the

14

officer can point to specific, articulable facts that would lead a reasonabiy prudent
person to believe the individual with whom the officer is dealing may pose a risk of
danger to the officer or others, and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves
to dispel this belief. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 30; State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-661
(2007); State v. Watson, 143 Idaho 840, 843 (Ct. App. 2007). The lawfulness of a patdown search is evaluated objectively, in light of the facts known to the officer on the
scene, and the inferences of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of
those specific circumstances. Henage, 143 Idaho at 660-661.
As the Court in Terry recognized, "[a] search which is reasonable at its inception
may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope." 392
U.S. at 18-19 (citations omitted). Accordingly,
[t]he permissible scope of a pat-down search for weapons is limited to the
minimum intrusion necessary to reasonably assure the officer that the
suspect does not have a weapon. If the officer is unable to make an
objectively reasonable determination that an object causing a bulge under
a person's clothing is not a weapon by feeling its size and density, the
officer is entitled to further invade the person's privacy only to the extent
necessary that such a determination can be made.
Watson, 143 Idaho at 845.

The circumstances surrounding the search here are very close to those
addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Watson. 143 Idaho 840. In Watson, police
were called to investigate the defendant after neighbors reported he was causing a
disturbance. Id. at 842. In speaking with the defendant, the officer saw a bulky object
protruding from the pocket of the defendant's pants.

Id.

After handcuffing the

defendant, the officer did a pat-down search for weapons. Id. The officer felt a hard
object, but was unable to determine if the object was a weapon. Id. at 845-846. As a
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result, rather than simply removing the hard object from the pocket, the officer emptied
the entire contents of the defendant's pocket. Watson, at 846. In emptying the contents
of the defendant's pocket, the officer found money, a toothpaste container, keys, and a
plastic bag containing methamphetamine. Id. at 842.
The defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine evidence, which the
district court denied.

Id.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the officer's

intentional removal of all items from the defendant's pocket, including those that could
not have been weapons, was unreasonable. Id. at 847. Specifically, the Court found
that, "the officer exceeded the scope of a pat-down search for weapons when he
emptied [the defendant's] pocket." Id.; see also State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 220-21
(Ct. App. 1984) (holding that officer's reaching into defendant's pocket to remove
money, instead of conducting "pat-down" search for weapons, exceeded permissible
scope of detention to conduct investigative stop).

When an officer "has reason to

believe that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous, the officer is entitled to
'conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which may be used to assault him."' Id. at 214-15 (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 30). In Cook, where no evidence was presented that the officer searching
the defendant believed that the wad of money found in his pants felt like a weapon, the
search went beyond the permitted scope of a frisk for weapons. Id. at 215.
In this case, based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Thiemann and
Officer Bekker had no reasonable, articulable basis to believe that Mr. Rowland was
armed or posed a risk of danger to any of the officers. First, there was no testimony or
evidence presented at the suppression hearing which would lend support to either
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officer believing that Mr. Rowland may pose a risk of danger to the officer or others.
(See 2/27/14 Tr.) Nor did the search warrant did not identify any weapons believed to
be located in the house. (11/4/13 Search Warrant, attached to Motion to Augment filed
on February 12, 2015.) Second, Officer Bekker testified that he did not feel anything
that was metal or a knife or a gun when he patted down the outside of Mr. Rowland's
clothing.

(2/27/14 Tr., p.29, Ls.6-21.) Third, like the defendant in Watson, Mr. Rowland

was handcuffed at the time of the search which would have seriously limited his ability
to access and use a weapon. (2/27/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-4, p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.1.)
Additionally, the "Terry search" of Mr. Rowland was far beyond the permissible
pat-down for weapons permitted under the Terry exception to the warrant requirement.
Here, Officer Bekker explained that he performed a "Terry search" of Mr. Rowland,
meaning:
A. All I search on a Terry search is their belt, where their hands are going
to be when they're handcuffs, and their front and back pockets to make
sure they can't grab anything.
Q. So in your training, a pat-down does involve you reaching into
someone's pocket and removing everything?
A. In their front and back pockets, correct. A full search would be on the
chest.

(2/27/14 Tr., p.27, Ls.3-12.)
Thus, because the search involved taking everything out of Mr. Rowland's
pockets, the search exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry pat-down. See Watson.
Mr. Rowland asserts that the search was illegal and any evidence obtained as a result
must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 478-88 (1963).
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The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rowland's Motion To Suppress
Because Mr. Rowland Was Not Under Arrest Until After The Incriminating Item
Was Found On His Person And The Police Did Not Have Probable Cause To
Arrest Him Prior To The Search Of His Person
In the present case, because this was a warrantless search of Mr. Rowland's
person, the State bore the burden of proving that the search fell within a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement.

Although the State asserted that this was a

search incident to arrest exception (2/27/14 Tr., p.30, Ls.13-17), that exception is
inapplicable based on the facts of this case where Mr. Rowland was not under arrest at
the time of the search, and there was no probable cause to arrest him prior to the
of his person. Thus, officers searched Mr. Rowland's pockets without a valid
to the warrant requirement. As such, the district

when it denied

his motion to suppress.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is exempted from the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement.

Cook, 106 Idaho at 215. A warrantless arrest and warrantless

search incident to that arrest can legally occur in the event the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a public offense. Id. Further, if
an arresting officer has probable cause to believe that an arrestee committed an
offense, a search incident to an arrest can legally occur before the arrestee is formally
arrested. Id.
Probable cause is information which would lead a person of ordinary care and
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the subject of
arrest is guilty. State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 677 (1979). Moreover, a probable cause
determination must be particularized to the person searched or seized and cannot be
"undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists
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probable cause to search ... the premises where the person happens to be." State v.
Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 283 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91

(1979)).
Here, officers did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Rowland at the time he
was searched. The district court held that the presence of a chainsaw in the house was
sufficient probable cause to arrest Mr. Rowland for possession of stolen property;
however, such was error. (R., p.132.) A chainsaw is a relatively common tool that may
be found in a residence and is not so unique an item as to instantly be recognizable as
contraband. Many homes have chainsaws, and the presence of chainsaw parts, where
the warrant identified a Stihl brand chainsaw, does not, in and of itself, constitute
probable cause to believe this was the chainsaw the thief described, particularly where
Officer Thiemann testified that she had not yet verified the serial number on the
chainsaw parts matched that of the stolen chainsaw. (2/27 /14 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-25, p.16,
L.21 - p.18, L.2.) Further, there were several people inside the house when the warrant
was served and there was no testimony or evidence adduced that tied Mr. Rowland to
the chainsaw parts found on the stairs. (2/27/14 Tr., p.24, Ls.20-24.) Thus there was
no evidence adduced at the suppression hearing which would show that Mr. Rowland
was in possession of the chainsaw parts at the time of the search of his person.
The district court erred when it found that the search of Mr. Rowland's person
was covered by the search warrant or constituted a valid exception to the warrant
requirement. And, therefore, the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence
obtained in the illegal search of Mr. Rowland's person.
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CONCLUSION

Mr. Rowland respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
of judgment and commitment, reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress,
and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 1ih day of February, 2015.

SALL y f/cobLfzY
J .
Deputy State Appellate P,t1bl1c Defender
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